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Abstract: The model of addiction proposed by Redish et al. shows a lack
of fit with recent data and models in psychological studies of addiction. In
these dual process models, relatively automatic appetitive processes are
distinguished from explicit goal-directed expectancies and motives,
whereas these are all grouped together in the planning system in the
Redish et al. model. Implications are discussed.
We appreciate the attempt in the target article by Redish et al. to
provide an integrative framework for addiction from a multiple
systems view, and we find many of the suggestions regarding
addictive behaviors thought provoking. Our main concern is
related to the lack of fit of the theoretical framework with
recent data and models from psychological science.
Redish et al. distinguish between two broad processes that
jointly explain addictions: an explicit and slow planning
system, relying on stimulus/response-outcome (S/R-O) associ-
ations, and an implicit and fast habit system relying on stimu-
lus-action/response (S-A/R) associations (Table 3 of the target
article). In many recent psychological theories of addiction, a
distinction is also made between two broad systems that super-
ficially resemble the proposed systems (e.g., Deutsch & Strack
2006; Evans & Coventry 2006; Stacy & Wiers 2006; Wiers &
Stacy 2006a; 2006b; Wiers et al. 2007). These models follow
general dual process models in psychology in which the most
characteristic difference between the systems concerns the rep-
resentational format, not the contents of the associations (e.g.,
Strack & Deutsch 2004). In this model, the reflective system
uses the representations in the impulsive system and can
perform logical operations on these representations, such as
negation or placing the contents in a different time (e.g., the
future). Deutsch et al. (2006) have demonstrated the conse-
quence of this difference in representational format. When an
association is learned and later participants are told that in
fact the association was not true, participants correct this as
becomes evident from their explicit expectancies, but when
their automatic associations are assessed, they still show the
original association. A study by Krank and Swift (1994) shows
that this can have serious real-life consequences: adolescents
who were told that alcohol does not make you sexy (a prevalent
alcohol expectancy in adolescents; Goldman et al. 1999), showed
stronger automatic associations between alcohol and sex a week
later. This effect is opposite to what would be predicted if this
association was only governed by a propositional planning
system (cf. Gawronski et al. 2008).
Relatedly, Redish et al. do not acknowledge a range of auto-
matic associations that are conceptual (multi-modal) in nature,
which do not necessarily involve S-A/R associations. These
associative processes can be dissociated from explicit memory
and operations of the planning systems. Examples include
associations processed during semantic priming (e.g., Hutchi-
son 2003; Weingardt et al. 1996), implicit conceptual
memory (e.g., Levy et al. 2004), or construct activation tasks
(e.g., Arndt et al. 2002). The automatic activation of a variety
of different classes of associations (beyond S-A/R) can spon-
taneously bias processing and judgments in ways that do not
appear to involve planning, as revealed in social psychological
research (e.g., Bargh & Morsella 2008). Hence, our general
point here is that there are many more associative processes
that predict behavior than the S-A/R associations of the
habit system and that these can be dissociated from explicit
memory processes in the planning system.
When we turn to psychological addiction research, recent
studies have found that relatively automatic processes such as
an attentional bias for a substance, automatic memory associ-
ations, and action tendencies to approach alcohol are relatively
independent from explicit processes such as motives and expec-
tancies (see Wiers et al. 2007 for a review). Expectancies and
substance associations typically show low correlations and
predict unique variance in substance use (e.g., Houben &
Wiers 2006; Stacy 1997; Wiers et al. 2002). In recent studies,
the relative predictive power of automatic substance associ-
ations and explicit expectancies to explain substance use was
assessed in adolescents who differed in working memory
(WM) capacity. For smoking (Grenard et al., in press) and
alcohol use (Thush et al. 2008), substance use was better pre-
dicted by automatic associations in participants with relatively
poor WM capacity. Interestingly, Thush et al. (2008) found
the opposite pattern for explicit expectancies, which predicted
alcohol use better in participants with high WM capacity.
Hence, some individuals’ substance use appears to be more
driven by their automatic associations, whereas others (with
equally strong automatic substance associations but with a stron-
ger WM capacity on top) appear to be more “rational” substance
users. In summary, the distinction between relatively automatic
or implicit associations and explicit expectancies has been fruit-
ful in psychological research on addiction (see Wiers & Stacy
2006a; 2006b; Wiers et al. 2005; 2007). Although Redish et al.
also differentiate between two main systems (planning and
habit), many of the processes distinguished in psychological
research appear to be inaccurately grouped together and sub-
sumed in their planning system.
A third issue concerns the role of conscious motivation in drug
seeking. Redish et al. state that overvaluation of expected drug
outcomes leads to craving and that this overvaluation in the plan-
ning system might be the result of incentive salience attribution,
citing Robinson and Berridge (1993; 2003). These authors,
however, differentiate between “wanting,” the neural process of
incentive salience attribution, and subjective craving, which
can, but does not necessarily, result from the unconscious
“wanting” process. This distinction may explain, for example,
that smokers, after a Pavlovian conditioning procedure, show
strong approach tendencies to smoking stimuli, particularly in
the presence of cues predicting smoking opportunity, without
these cues eliciting increased subjective craving (Thewissen
et al. 2007). In line with this distinction, a recent meta-analysis
found low correlations between subjective craving and an atten-
tional bias for alcohol (Field et al., in preparation). Redish et al.
attribute devaluation and need-dependent evaluations exclu-
sively to the planning system. However, recent studies suggest
that automatic evaluations can be need-dependent (e.g., Seibt
et al. 2007).
In summary, we believe that there is evidence that relatively
automatic appetitive processes in addiction should not be cate-
gorized together with subjective craving and explicit expectan-
cies in the planning system. This does not imply that they are
part of the habit system either. Perhaps these relatively auto-
matic processes are an intermediate step between explicit pro-
cesses in the planning system characteristic of drug use
initiation and the reward independent associations characteristic
of the habit system in late phases of addiction (cf. Everitt &
Robbins 2005).
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